Is the 2025 DRC–Rwanda Peace Agreement Actually Working?

On 27 June 2025, the governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda signed a peace agreement in Washington, D.C.. To many observers, this appeared to be a major diplomatic breakthrough. The two countries have had a long and tense relationship, often expressed through conflict in eastern Congo, and the agreement was presented as a step toward ending years of instability. For those encountering this issue for the first time, however, it is important to understand that the agreement did not emerge in a vacuum—it is rooted in a deeply complex and long-running regional conflict.

Eastern Congo has, for decades, been one of the most volatile regions in the world. Despite its vast natural wealth, including minerals essential to global technology industries, the region has remained plagued by insecurity and armed violence. Numerous armed groups operate there, driven by a mixture of political, economic, and ethnic motivations. Among them is the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a militia that Rwanda considers a direct security threat due to its links to those responsible for the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. At the same time, the Congolese government has repeatedly accused Rwanda of backing rebel movements within its territory, particularly the March 23 Movement (M23). These mutual accusations have created a persistent atmosphere of distrust, making any peace effort inherently fragile.

It is against this backdrop that the 2025 agreement was signed. On paper, it was ambitious. It aimed not only to reduce tensions between the two states but also to address the broader security environment. The agreement included commitments for the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from Congolese territory, the dismantling of armed groups such as the FDLR, and the establishment of joint security coordination mechanisms. It also sought to promote disarmament and reintegration of fighters, while introducing elements of economic cooperation, particularly around the management of natural resources. In theory, this combination of security and economic measures reflected a modern approach to peacebuilding—one that recognizes that sustainable peace requires more than simply stopping armed confrontation.

However, the reality since the signing of the agreement has been far less encouraging. Implementation has been slow and incomplete. Several months after the agreement was concluded, only a limited portion of its provisions had been put into practice. Key commitments, such as the full withdrawal of forces and the effective dismantling of armed groups, remain only partially fulfilled. More significantly, the situation on the ground has not fundamentally changed. Armed groups continue to operate in eastern Congo, and in some areas, violence persists at levels that suggest the agreement has yet to translate into meaningful security improvements for local populations.

One of the central challenges lies in the fact that not all key actors are fully included in the agreement. While it is a bilateral arrangement between states, much of the actual fighting is carried out by non-state armed groups. The M23, for instance, remains a major force in the region, yet its role within the framework of the agreement is limited. This creates a disconnect between high-level diplomacy and the realities of conflict on the ground. A peace agreement that does not fully engage those directly involved in hostilities is inherently constrained in its effectiveness.

Beyond this, the agreement struggles under the weight of deeper structural issues. The conflict in eastern Congo is not simply a matter of current political disagreement; it is tied to historical grievances, ethnic tensions, and the long-term weakness of state authority in the region. These are not issues that can be resolved quickly or through a single diplomatic instrument. Moreover, economic interests—particularly those linked to valuable mineral resources—continue to shape the dynamics of the conflict, sometimes complicating genuine efforts toward peace.

Trust remains another critical obstacle. The relationship between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo has long been characterised by mutual suspicion. Each side has accused the other of supporting armed groups and undermining stability. Even with a formal agreement in place, this lack of trust affects implementation. Commitments on paper do not automatically translate into action when each party questions the intentions of the other.

Yet, it would be inaccurate to dismiss the agreement entirely. It has had some stabilising effects. It has created a formal framework for dialogue and engagement, reducing the likelihood of direct, large-scale confrontation between the two states. It has also established mechanisms that, if properly utilised and strengthened, could serve as a foundation for future progress. In this sense, the agreement retains potential, even if that potential has not yet been realised.

Ultimately, the 2025 peace agreement should be understood not as a definitive solution but as an initial step in a much longer process. Its effectiveness so far has been limited, primarily due to gaps in implementation, the exclusion of key actors, and the persistence of underlying structural challenges. For peace to become more than an aspiration, there must be sustained commitment, broader inclusion, and a genuine effort to address the root causes of the conflict. Until then, the situation in eastern Congo will likely remain fragile, and the promise of the Washington agreement will only be partially fulfilled.